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The End of the Cold War and the Third World

New perspectives on regional conflict

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3 China's changing policies toward the Third World and the end of the global Cold War

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In retrospect, the global Cold War experienced a profound transformation in the long 1970s.[1] China occupied a central position in the process of this transformation. Along with the escalation of the Sino–Soviet confrontation and the making of Sino–US rapprochement, the Cold War's basic feature was as a contest between Communism and liberal capitalism as two competing paths heading toward modernity became obscured. China's turning toward the "reform and opening" process in the late 1970s – characterized by the world's most populous country gradually embracing the west-capitalist-dominated "world market" as the central agent in its pursuit of modernization – virtually meant that China was departing the Cold War.

Against this background, Mao Zedong introduced in 1973–1974 a nuanced "three worlds" thesis. The Chinese Chairman contended that the first world was made up of the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union; the second world was composed of such relatively developed countries as those in Western Europe, Australia, Canada, and Japan; and the Third World was formed by the vast majority of developing countries in Asia, Africa and also Latin America. He announced that China, which remained "relatively poor," belonged to the Third World.[2]

An outstanding feature of the Maoist three-worlds thesis was that it took differences in levels of economic development, rather than contests and confrontations between different ideologies and political and social systems, as the basic criteria for defining the three worlds. Such a thesis nullified the boundaries between Communism and capitalism and had an enormous impact on the ongoing Cold War. In particular, it further reduced the influence and power of the international Communist movement that had already been in profound division, creating another important condition for the Cold War to end with the collapse of the Soviet camp.

This chapter discusses how the Maoist three-worlds thesis came into being; how the thesis and, related to it, Beijing's policies toward the Third World, evolved in the context of China's changing domestic situation and international perceptions in the long 1970s; and how China's Third World

policies changed not only the balance of power between the US and the Soviet Union but also the orientation or even essence of the Cold War, contributing to the Cold War's eventual conclusion with the failure of International Communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc.

I

From a historical perspective, the Maoist conception of the three worlds had its roots in the Chinese Communist revolution's long course of development. Since its early years, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) embraced such concepts as "world revolution" and "proletarian internationalism" while, at the same time, emphasizing that the Chinese revolution was also a "national revolution" and stood as an integral component of oppressed peoples' worldwide cause for national liberation. After the Second World War, when the Chinese Civil War erupted in the context of the rising Cold War, Mao introduced a series of new ideas about the postwar world situation, which the CCP would later characterize as Mao's intermediate-zone theory. Mao and his comrades argued that between the US and the Soviet Union there existed a vast "intermediate zone" in Asia, Africa and Europe, and that the US imperialists could not directly attack the Soviet Union until they had control of the zone. Accordingly, they contended that the principal contradiction in the world rested with the struggles between peoples in the intermediate zone and the reactionary US ruling class, as well as between China and the US.[3]

The Maoist intermediate-zone notion revealed the CCP's determination to challenge the US as a dominant imperialist power and to stand on the side of the Soviet Union. In the meantime, by highlighting the central role that China was to play in bridging world revolution and decolonization, the notion also presaged that the Cold War would have to become a phenomenon more complicated than if there had not been China's inputs.

After its establishment in 1949, the People's Republic of China (PRC) acted as a radical "revolutionary country" on the international scene, challenging the legitimacy of the existing international system controlled by Western powers. In October 1950, Beijing sent troops to Korea to support Kim Il-Sung's North Korean Communist regime, engaging in a direct military confrontation with the US that would last until July 1953.[4] Beijing also provided military and other support to the Vietnamese Communists in a war against the French colonialists.[5] PRC policies towards such non-Western countries as Malaya, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and, on occasions, India were a mixture of harsh criticism (labeling them as "lackeys of Western imperialism") and attempts to neutralize them in the Cold War environment.[6]

A major turning point came in 1954–1955. At the Geneva Conference of 1954, the PRC delegation led by Premier Zhou Enlai took the initiative

to meet with delegates from several non-Communist countries. In late June, Zhou visited India and Burma. Together with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Burmese prime minister U Nu, Zhou introduced the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence."[7] On 18–24 April 1955, the Chinese participated in the Bandung Conference of leaders from 29 countries in Asia and Africa. Zhou made extensive efforts to have dialogs with leaders from other countries, emphasizing the common historical experience between China and other non-Western countries.[8]

Beijing's adoption of the five-principles-oriented Bandung Discourse had important normative meanings: this reflected the PRC's continuous challenge to the Western powers (and, potentially, also to the Soviet Union) by introducing a whole set of new norms and codes of behavior in international affairs. While doing so, Mao again went beyond the Cold War's bipolar framework and used the intermediate zone concept to illuminate and define the international structure.[9] In the meantime, Mao and his comrades repeatedly emphasized that China and such former colonies as India and Burma belonged to "Eastern countries," and they shared similar cultural and historical traditions as well as recent humiliation at the hands of Western powers.

Indeed, the Chinese experience at Geneva and Bandung revealed Beijing's strong desire to play a more central role in international affairs. Mao's intermediate-zone notion of the late 1940s tended to lean toward the side of the Soviet Union. In comparison, in the mid-1950s, within the context of the emerging leadership vacuum in the International Communist movement after Stalin's death, Mao increasingly believed that it was Beijing's overall capacity of revolutionizing the worldwide process of decolonization – a capacity that was not possessed by Moscow – that had enabled China's centrality in the world revolution.

In the wake of Bandung, the PRC established diplomatic relations with a dozen Asian and African countries. Beijing held positive attitudes toward the newly emerging non-alignment trend among Asian and African countries. When the Suez crisis erupted in 1956, Beijing adopted a high-profile approach to support Gamal Abdel Nasser's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal. In the meantime, Beijing strongly opposed Moscow's attempt to use Pancha Shila in dealing with Washington. During Mao's visit to Moscow in November 1957, he deliberately challenged the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's emphasis on "peaceful coexistence" with Western imperialist countries.[10] When the relationship between Moscow and Beijing was in trouble, the bipolar structure of the Cold War became further shaken.

The PRC's foreign policy turned more radical in 1958 when the "Great Leap Forward" swept across China's cities and countryside. The trigger that Mao and his comrades used to justify the extraordinary mass mobilization during the Great Leap was the US–British intervention in response to the coup in Iraq led by Abdel Karim Kassim. Under the banner of "supporting the Arab people's anti-imperialist struggle," Mao ordered the

People's Liberation Army to shell the Nationalists-controlled Jinmen islands. When US President Dwight D. Eisenhower dispatched the US Seventh Fleet to help the Nationalists protect Jinmen's supply lines, a serious crisis erupted between Beijing and Washington. As Mao did not inform Moscow in advance of his decision to shell Jinmen, Chinese-Soviet relations worsened even more.[11]

The PRC's position and image in the non-Western world hit a major hurdle in 1959, when a series of conflicts erupted between China and India. In March 1959, Beijing used force to suppress an anti-Chinese Communist revolt in Tibet, and the Dalai Lama, Tibet's religious and political leader, took refuge in India, which led to serious tensions in Sino–Indian relations.[12] In the fall of 1959, two border clashes occurred between Chinese and Indian forces, further shattering any remaining trust between Chinese and Indian leaders. Underlying the deterioration of Chinese-Indian relations, though, was the potential conflict between Beijing and New Delhi concerning which country – China or India – should claim the leadership role in the larger non-Western world in the post-colonial age.

The early 1960s witnessed temporary relaxation of China's domestic and international policies following the Great Leap's disastrous failure. With Mao retreating to the "second line" after 1960–1961, his colleagues, such as Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, adopted a series of more flexible domestic policies to pursue economic recovery and social stability. Along with this came the softening of China's radical international policies as well. Yet this period did not last long. When China's economy showed signs of recovery from the dark shadow of the Great Leap, Mao quickly pushed China toward another period of "revolutionary high tide." In order to legitimate the radicalization of China's domestic political and social life, Mao repeatedly stressed that China was facing an international environment full of crises, arguing that the international reactionary forces headed by US imperialists were preparing to wage a war against China.[13] Mao also openly criticized the Kremlin's strategy of "peaceful coexistence," claiming that it obscured the fundamental distinction between revolution and counterrevolution.

Against the above background Mao put forward his "two intermediate zones" thesis. He argued that between the US and the Soviet Union "there exist two intermediate zones." The first was composed of "the vast economically backward countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America," and the second included "imperialist and advanced capitalist countries in Europe." It was in the first intermediate zone, of which China was also a part, where both the US and the Soviet Union were "being rebuffed everywhere," and the US encountered challenges and difficulties in the second intermediate zone.[14] After 1962–1963, China's international discourse, while alleging that the center of the world revolution had moved to Beijing, increasingly highlighted the central role that the PRC had played in promoting revolutionary movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In the wake of the

Gulf of Tonkin incident of August 1964, Beijing extended comprehensive security commitments and provided all kinds of support to North Vietnam.[15] When Indonesian President Sukarno, with the support of the Indonesian Communists, launched the New Emerging Force movement, Beijing supported it enthusiastically. Beijing also endeavored to expand China's influence in Africa, beginning by offering economic, technological and medical support to African countries that were most friendly to China, including Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Mali, Somalia, Tanzania, and Zambia. When the second Asian-Afro conference was scheduled to be convened in Algeria in June 1965, Beijing firmly opposed allowing the Soviet Union to participate in the conference, even as an observer. Beijing also argued that India, as a "lackey" of Western imperialists, should not play a major role in the conference.

When the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" unfolded in the mid and late 1960s, Beijing's international behavior seemed to be running out of control. China's confrontations with the US and conflicts with the Soviet Union escalated, its hostility toward India continued, and even its relations with several friendly neighboring countries, such as Burma and Cambodia, deteriorated. In Sino–North Vietnamese relations, Beijing's leaders repeatedly urged Hanoi not to negotiate with Washington while, at the same time, rejecting any attempt by Moscow to use the theme of "supporting the Vietnamese people" to carry out any "united action" against the US within the International Communist movement.[16] Even Beijing's solidarity with North Korea suffered during the Cultural Revolution years as the Red Guards publicly attacked North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung as a "revisionist."[17]

By the late 1960s, the PRC had become one of the most isolated countries in the world, facing serious security threats from all directions. The US intervention in Vietnam put great pressure on China's southern borders. The hostility between China and the Soviet Union culminated in March 1969, when two bloody clashes erupted between Chinese and Soviet forces on Zhenbao island on the Ussuri River.[18] China also faced hostile enemies from the east (Taiwan, Japan and South Korea), and from the West (India).

II

The early 1970s witnessed sensational changes in China's external relations. The extreme tensions that had existed in Beijing's domestic and international policies during the Cultural Revolution years had made them unsustainable. The grave security situation that China was facing in the late 1960s, combined with the fading status of Mao's enterprise of "continuous revolution" (indeed, following the failure of the "Cultural Revolution," Mao's programs of transforming China's state and society were increasingly losing the "inner support" of China's ordinary people), created the larger context in which the Sino–US rapprochement

occurred.[19] In February 1972, during "the week that changed the world," US President Richard Nixon made the historic trip to China and met with Mao in Beijing.[20]

The impact of the Sino–US rapprochement was far-reaching. As far as relations between Beijing and Washington were concerned, it ended the total confrontation between the PRC and the US that had lasted for almost a quarter of a century, opening a thoroughly new chapter in the development of relations between the world's most populous nation and its most powerful one. On the global scale, it dramatically shifted the balance of power between the two conflicting superpowers – the USA and the Soviet Union – in the Cold War. While policymakers in Washington found it possible to concentrate more US resources and strategic attention on dealing with the threats by the Soviet Union, Moscow's leaders, having to confront the West and China simultaneously, were more likely to seriously overextend Soviet strength and power.

In a deeper sense, though, Beijing's cooperation with Washington and confrontation with Moscow implied a changing essence of the global Cold War. Ever since its beginning in the late 1940s, the Cold War had been characterized by a fundamental confrontation between two contending ideologies – Communism and liberal capitalism. The Sino–US rapprochement obscured the distinctions between socialist and capitalist ways toward modernity. The Sino–Soviet split buried the shared belief among Communists in the world that Communism was a workable solution to the problems created by the worldwide process of modernization.

Against the above background, Mao introduced his three-worlds thesis in a series of talks with foreign leaders in 1973–1974. On 22 June 1973, he used the term "three worlds" to describe the world situation in a conversation with Moussa Traoré, Mali's head of state, then visiting China: "All of us have been called Third World (countries)," stated the chairman, "that is, we are all developing countries."[21] Several months later, Mao told Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia:

> The US and the Soviet Union belong to the First World. The middle elements, such as Japan, Europe, Australia and Canada, belong to the Second World. We are the Third World.... The US and the Soviet Union have a lot of atomic bombs, and they are richer. Europe, Japan, Australia and Canada, of the Second World, do not possess so many atomic bombs and are not so rich as the First World, but richer than the Third World.... All Asian countries, except Japan, and all of Africa and also Latin America belong to the Third World.[22]

Mao then said to Algerian leader Houari Boumediene that "China belongs to the Third World, as politically and economically China is not in the same group of the rich and powerful, and thus can only be with those countries that are relatively poor."[23]

Mao's new expressions immediately became the basic guideline of the PRC's international policies. On 10 April 1974, Chinese vice premier Deng Xiaoping brought Mao's three-worlds thesis to the General Assembly of the UN. Deng labeled the Soviet Union and the US, the two superpowers that formed the First World, as "the two largest international oppressors and exploitators" and the "main war originators in the contemporary era." The Second World, composed of other capitalist/developed countries, while facing the attempts by the two superpowers to control them, demonstrated in their policies the legacies of their own past as colonial powers. The Third World, formed by the vast majority of developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, favored the "tendency of revolution" and opposed "the tendency of war," and they thus represented the "force playing a major role in promoting progress in the world."[24]

It is apparent that Mao's three-worlds thesis grew out of his intermediate-zone/two-intermediate-zones notions, and between them there existed striking similarities in perceptions of how the structure of the world should be defined and transformed. In particular, by highlighting the rising influences of non-Western countries in international affairs, they posed a fundamental challenge to the existing world order and envisioned China as a central actor in bringing about changes in the world. But there were also significant differences between the earlier intermediate zone/two intermediate zones notions and the three-worlds thesis. While the former was formulated around the discourse of "international class struggle" and revolution in its representation, what formed the foundation and the primary concern of the latter was the issue of economic development. In presenting the three-worlds thesis, Mao and his fellow Chinese leaders still used some "class struggle" language (such as describing the First World as international "oppressors" and "exploiters"). However, as far as the thesis's basic problematique is concerned, it already highlighted the importance of "development" as a question of fundamental importance that China and other Third World countries must encounter.

When the three-worlds thesis was made the dominant theme in China's international representation, with Mao's approval, a "four modernizations" discourse entered China's domestic affairs. At a speech to a National People's Congress assembly in January 1975, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai announced that China should aim to modernize its industry, agriculture, national defense, and science and technology by the end of the century.[25]

As is well known, Mao had championed transforming China and the world in revolutionary ways. Thus, his introduction of the development-oriented three-worlds theory and acceptance of the "Four Modernizations" representation toward the end of his life are worthy of some discussion. In the final analysis, this was Mao's way of dealing with the worsening legitimacy crisis that his "continuous revolution" had been facing. Ever since Mao proclaimed at the time of the PRC's formation that "we the Chinese people have stood up," he legitimated his "revolution after revolution" by

repeatedly emphasizing how his revolutionary programs would change China into a country of "wealth and power." When the Chinese Communist state was encountering an ever-deepening legitimacy crisis as a result of the economic stagnation and political cruelty that Mao's revolutions had conferred on the Chinese people, the Chairman embraced the "three worlds" and "four modernizations" notions for emphasizing – first and foremost to the Chinese people – that his revolutions continuously played a central role in benefiting China and transforming the world.

China was then, still, in the middle of the Cultural Revolution, and Beijing's international representations were still replete with revolutionary phrases. Yet Mao's three-worlds thesis changed the discursive context in which China's patterns of development and, more generally, its path toward modernity would be defined, resulting in subtle changes in China's overall development strategies and policies. In 1973–1974, Beijing approved 26 major projects on importing new equipment and technology from Western countries and Japan, with a total budget of $4.3 billion.[26] Implementation of these projects strengthened China's ties with the "world market" dominated by Western capitalist countries. Even though until the last days of Mao's life, the Chairman never gave up his ideal and practice of "transforming" China in revolutionary ways, the insurmountable boundary between revolutionary China and the "outside world" was beginning to erode.

The Maoist three-worlds thesis also had a powerful impact in strategic terms, especially as, from the beginning, it had a strong pro-US and anti-Soviet tendency in its description and definition. Although Mao labeled the Soviet Union and the US as both belonging to the First World, he did not mean to treat them on equal terms. Informed by his previous experience in dealing with the Soviet threat, Mao had developed a strong conviction that of the two superpowers, the Soviet Union was the one that was on the offensive, and was thus more dangerous to China's security interests as well as to world peace than the US. In Deng's speech at the UN, which was approved by Mao, the Chinese vice premier pointed out that although both the US and the Soviet Union were the only powers capable of starting a nuclear war, the Soviet Union was more willing to do so.[27] With the introduction of the three-worlds thesis, Mao further developed the general ideas of forming an anti-Soviet "international united front." On 17 February 1973, in a conversation with US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Mao mentioned that, in order to cope with the Soviet threat, "we should draw a horizontal line – the US–Japan–China–Pakistan–Iran–Turkey–Europe."[28] He then repeated the idea on several other occasions, going so far as to emphasize that with the "horizontal line" as the axis, "a vast number of countries" should be mobilized to cope with the Soviet threat.[29]

The idea of building an "international united front against hegemony" became an important parameter in defining the orientation of Chinese policies towards the Third World in the early and mid-1970s. When

Beijing's leaders made policies toward a certain Third World country, they paid great attention to that country's attitudes toward the Soviet Union. Thus, we see that along with the introduction of Mao's three-worlds thesis, China's relations with a series of right-wing, anti-Soviet and anti-Communist Third World countries improved. A revealing case in this respect was Chile. Although Salvador Allende's left-wing, socialist government was the first among South American countries to recognize the PRC and establish diplomatic relations with it, Beijing was critical of Allende's pro-Soviet policies. When Allende's government was overthrown in a military coup in September 1973, Beijing's leaders refused to condemn the reactionary coup leaders, and attributed the main cause of Allende's downfall to "the mistaken economic policies" as well as pro-Soviet attitudes of his government. Despite the urges by many "progressive countries," including many in the Third World, for Beijing to cut off relations with Augusto Pinochet's military regime, Beijing, by citing the five principles, continuously maintained normal diplomatic, economic and even political relations with it.[30] In the meantime, the PRC's relations with Cuba, the only Communist country in the western hemisphere, were very bad, and this was largely because Beijing's leaders regarded Fidel Castro as an ally and agent of the Soviet Union, a perception that would become further enhanced in the late 1970s when Cuban "volunteers" actively intervened in Africa (more discussion on this later in this chapter).

In the Middle East, Beijing's policies were also conditioned by the "international united front against hegemony" parameter. Since the 1956 Suez Crisis, Beijing had persistently claimed that the PRC supported the Arab countries and opposed Israel's expansion and aggression. Yet, entering the 1970s, Beijing's attitudes toward various Arabic countries differed in accordance with a particular country's relations with the Soviet Union. For instance, the PRC's relationship with Egypt improved and expanded significantly after Egyptian President Anwar Sadat decided to expel Soviet advisors in July 1972. After the 1973 Arab–Israeli war, the PRC increased military aid to Egypt to "remedy the decrease of Soviet support" that Cairo had received, and Sino–Egyptian trade expanded by five times between 1971 and 1977, the year after Egypt abrogated its treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union.[31] In comparison, Beijing's relationship with Syria was no better than lukewarm after the 1973 war, mainly because of Beijing's resentment of Damascus's pro-Soviet approach. Due to "the differences in attitudes toward the Soviet Union," Damascus did not send an ambassador to Beijing from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s.[32]

In Africa, Beijing had long claimed that the "new China" was a natural ally and firm supporter of the African people's causes of anti-Western imperialism/colonialism. Almost all of Beijing's friends in Africa until the early 1970s had been known as pro-socialist and anti-capitalist in their domestic and foreign policies. When, in the mid-1960s, Beijing's leaders

made the decision to help with the construction of the Tanzanian–Zambian Railway, the largest and most ambitious project of foreign aid that Beijing had ever carried out, they justified it by contending that the project demonstrated the new China's willingness and capacity in supporting the African people's anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist struggles.[33] The basic tone of Beijing's African strategies changed subtly yet significantly in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when "anti-Soviet-social-imperialism" was added as a guiding principle. Accordingly, the PRC established or restored relations with several pro-US and right-wing regimes in Africa in the mid-1970s. For example, despite Beijing's previous condemnation of Zaire's reactionary dictator Mobutu Sésé Seko, Mao personally welcomed him to Beijing on 13 January 1973, and had a "very friendly conversation." The PRC and Zaire had then established "extensive cooperation and exchanges" on the common ground of anti-hegemonism.[34]

China and India had been mutually hostile and confrontational since the 1962 border war between them. Beijing had claimed that the Indian "reactionary ruling clique" fought the war against China for serving the interests of US imperialism and taking advantage of the legacies left over by British colonialism. In the 1965 and 1971 India–Pakistan wars, China stood firmly on the side of Pakistan. In the early stages of the process leading to the Sino–US rapprochement, Pakistan served as the most important channel of communication between top leaders in Beijing and Washington.[35] The hostility between China and India existed continuously throughout the 1970s. But the focal point of Beijing's criticism of New Delhi had changed, and the "reactionary Indian leaders" were now branded as the "accomplices of the Soviet social imperialists."

Beijing had long regarded Southeast Asia as the "cradle of revolutions," and, ever since the PRC's establishment, yet especially in the 1960s, Beijing had provided substantial support for Communist forces there. Chinese policies toward Southeast Asia experienced subtle changes with the introduction of Mao's three-worlds thesis. In 1974–1975, the PRC established diplomatic relations with Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, all of which had been labeled by Beijing as "lackeys of US imperialism" in the previous two decades. In the meantime, Beijing began to abandon the practice of supporting Communist insurgents in Southeast Asia, gradually reducing its military and other aid to the Communist parties in Burma, Malaya (Malaysia), and Thailand. In the Chinese media, reports about Communist revolutions in these countries gradually disappeared. Although Beijing's leaders repeatedly promised that they would not be reconciled with the US over Vietnam, in the last stages of the US–Vietnamese talks in Paris, to end the Vietnam War, Beijing's leaders urged their comrades in Hanoi to cut a deal with the US. After the signing of the Paris Accords, Beijing significantly reduced its military and other aid to Hanoi almost immediately.[36] Beijing's new policy tendency was also shown in the case of Korea. In April 1975, against the background of impending Com-

munist victories in Indochina, North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung visited Beijing to try to gain China's backing for his renewed aspiration for using a "revolutionary war" to unify Korea. Beijing's leaders demonstrated little interest in, let alone support for, Kim's plans.[37] Even before Mao's death, China was no longer the same kind of country dominated by revolutionary zeal in its external behavior as it had been from the late 1940s to the early 1970s.

III

Mao died on 9 September 1976. After a short transitional period, during which Mao's hand-picked successor Hua Guofeng served as China's nominal Party leader and head of state, Deng Xiaoping emerged to become China's paramount leader. The most dramatic and far-reaching move that Deng made was to abandon Mao's class-struggle-centered discourse and revolutionary practice, placing the modernization of China's industry, agriculture, national defense, and science and technology at the top of his agenda.

Following his pragmatic "cat theory" – "black cat or white cat, so long as it catches mice, it is a good cat" – Deng allowed economics to take precedence over politics. Unleashed from these policies was the "reform and opening" process. Deng certainly sensed that the failure of Mao's "continuous revolution" had presented an ever-deepening legitimacy challenge to the Chinese Communist state, and he hoped that the improvement of living standards brought about by the "reform and opening" process would help bring legitimacy back to the Communist state.

In the shaping of the "reform and opening" process, there were major debates on many domestic issues between those who favored it and those who either opposed it or were suspicious of it. Yet, remarkably, there was little debate concerning foreign policies within the post-Mao Chinese leadership. From Hua to Deng, top Chinese leaders decided that they would follow the three-worlds framework that Mao had set up in the last years of his life. At the CCP's eleventh national congress, held in August 1977, the Party leadership used the three-worlds thesis to analyze the world situation, emphasizing that China would stand on the side of the majority of Third World countries, unite with second world countries, and form an "international united front against hegemony" (then a term exclusively used to point to the Soviet Union) that would also include the US.[38]

In assessing the two superpowers' relative positions in the world, following the thinking of Mao in his later years, Deng and his fellow Chinese leaders regarded the Soviet Union as more aggressive and, therefore, more dangerous than the US. After he climbed to the position of China's top leader, Deng repeatedly contended that the Soviet Union was on the offensive, whereas the US was on the defensive, although Moscow was yet to complete its global deployment of aggression and expansion (so he

meant that there was still time to stop it).[39] Deng's judgment of the seriousness of the "Soviet threat" occupied a crucial position in the post-Mao Chinese leadership's definition of the goals and tasks of Chinese policies toward the US, the second world, and the Third World in the late 1970s.

Comparing Deng's grand strategic visions with those of Mao's, though, there were some important changes too. In Sino–US relations, out of considerations broader than strategic issues, Deng was more eager than Mao to pursue Beijing's formal diplomatic relationship with Washington. For Mao, the "tacit alliance" between China and the US was primarily a strategic issue that also had profound domestic implications – it helped enhance China's overall security position while, at the same time, allowing Mao to tell the Chinese people that, indeed, "we, the Chinese people, have stood up" in spite of the failure of his "continuous revolution" programs. For Deng, these of Mao's considerations remained valid. In particular, the development of China's relationship with the US, the strongest country in the world that had been hostile to the "new China" for over two decades, served the Chinese leadership's need of retaining the Chinese people's support of the "Communist" state (which was made increasingly anything but "Communist" with the unfolding of the "reform and opening" process).

In the meantime, Deng's vision of Sino–US relations was closely related to his perception of the missions and goals of the "reform and opening" process that, first and foremost, were based upon a transformed approach toward the capitalist-dominated world market. Throughout the Maoist era, markets and the pursuit of profits were treated as values and practices inimical to genuine socialism. With the introduction of the "reform and opening" policies, Deng and the post-Mao Chinese leadership began to perceive China's path toward modernity in a very different light, and they looked to the West for models to formulate China's own development strategy. This meant a drastic departure from the Chinese experience of building socialism from the early 1950s to the early 1970s, when China wholeheartedly embraced the Soviet model that was characterized by a rigid state-controlled command economy. For Deng, Beijing's partnership with Washington remained valuable in the geopolitical and strategic sense. Yet, more importantly for Deng, China's tacit alliance with the US was highly compatible with his new vision of looking to the West for models of modernizing China. Deng thus set great emphasis on the PRC gaining full diplomatic recognition from the US which happened on 1 January 1979.

Deng's "Soviet threat" perception and his "looking to the West" approach were of critical importance in shaping the post-Mao Chinese leadership's Third World strategies and policies. Reportedly, on his way to visit the US in late January 1979, Deng said to his assistants:

> If we look back, we find that all of those (Third World countries) that were on the side of the United States have been successful (in their

> modernization drive), whereas all of those that were against the United States have not been successful. We shall be on the side of the United States.[40]

Within this context, Deng and his fellow Chinese leaders paid special attention to the successful experience of the "four little dragons" – Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong. When Deng justified, within the Chinese leadership, the necessity of China adopting the grand strategy of "reform and opening" to the outside world, he repeatedly quoted South Korea's and Taiwan's successful experiences in their modernization drives, emphasizing that China would have to learn from those experiences or, otherwise, it would lag further behind in economic development.

Against the above background, China's Third World policies in the late 1970s had three outstanding features: departing revolution, emphasizing development, and containing the "Soviet threat." The "reform and opening" process had already unleashed a de-revolutionizing process in China's domestic policies. Within this context, Beijing's leaders also decided to dramatically reduce and, then, completely stop China's material support for Communist insurgents abroad. Since the early 1950s, and especially during the Cultural Revolution years, China had provided military and other support to Communist rebels in such countries as Burma, Malaya (Malaysia), and Thailand. The trend began to change after Nixon's visit. With the inauguration of the "reform and opening" policies, Beijing's leaders determined that it was time for China to completely stop supporting Communist insurgents abroad. In 1980, Beijing informed the Burmese Communists that China would gradually reduce its aid to them over the next five years, and would then completely cut off the aid.[41] In December 1980, Deng told Chin Peng, the Secretary General of the Malayan Communist Party who had been in exile in China since 1960, to stop the operation of Suara Revolusi, the Party's radio station operating from Chinese territory since the early 1970s.[42]

Beijing's leaders also attached great emphasis to the economic aspects of China's foreign policies in general and its policies toward the Third World in particular. In order to concentrate China's limited resources on promoting the modernization drive at home and respond to the changing international situation, Beijing's leaders significantly reduced China's economic aid to quite a few Third World countries – and those with close relations with the Soviet Union (such as Vietnam) or hostile to China (such as Albania, which Beijing had regarded as the only Third World country in Europe) in particular. Beginning in the late 1970s, China was increasingly entering the "world market," and thus it also increasingly adopted the "normal methods" – that is, through the market – in handling trade relations with other countries, including many Third World countries. The barter method that China had previously used in trade relations with Third World countries had been gradually abandoned. All of this, as

Odd Arne Westad points out, "inevitably resulted in structural changes in the international market," and "made it more difficult for non-capitalist countries to obtain favorable prices in face of the diversification of the global economy" brought about, to a large extent, by China's "reform and opening" process.[43]

The overriding factor underlying Chinese policies toward the Third World in the late 1970s and early 1980s was the serious concern about containing the perceived global expansion of the Soviet Union. As discussed earlier, from Mao to Deng, the Chinese leadership believed that the Soviet Union was the one that was on the offensive among the two superpowers. Beijing's concerns about the seriousness of the Soviet threat had reached their most worrisome level by the late 1970s, as the Chinese leaders believed that they were seeing that the Soviets had been "gaining" in many different parts of the Third World. Those worries were most clearly spelt out by Deng himself in an interview with *Time Magazine*'s Hedley Donovan and Marsh Clark in early 1979:

> We see that last year South Yemen was taken over by the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union gained influence in Ethiopia. If we go farther east there is Afghanistan, and now there is Iran, where there seems to be no end to the troubles. And Pakistan. And farther to the east, Viet Nam controls Laos by military means, and the Vietnamese made a major invasion into Cambodia with more than ten divisions. And then if we go even farther east, do we see that the Soviet military force has been strengthened or weakened in the Asian and Pacific region? At least its navy and air force have been strengthened. The Soviet fleet in the Far East is now equal in strength to the Soviet fleet in the Atlantic. So all this gives serious concern to the countries of the world, and they should deal with it seriously.[44]

Thus, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and Cuba's intervention in Africa became two central events in China's dealings with the Third World. In the case of Vietnam, Chinese and Vietnamese Communists were close allies during the First Indochina War and for most of the Second Indochina War. Beginning in the late 1960s, relations between the two Communist allies began to deteriorate. After the Vietnamese Communists unified the whole country in 1975, hostility quickly developed between Beijing and Hanoi. Yet it was not until Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia in December 1978 that the breakdown of Sino–Vietnamese relations reached the point of no return. In addition to the memory of the historical conflicts between the two countries, Hanoi's discrimination against ethnic Chinese living in Vietnam, Beijing's long-existing suspicion of the Vietnamese intention to establish their own regional hegemony in Indochina (the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 turned this Chinese suspicion into certainty), Beijing's

leaders also firmly believed that Hanoi was acting as an agent of Moscow's hegemonic ambitions, leading Soviet expansion into the region south of China. Consequently, on 17 February 1979, Chinese troops started a large-scale invasion of Vietnam to "teach the Vietnamese a lesson." After fierce fighting and suffering heavy casualties, the Chinese troops seized Lang Son and Cai Bang, two strategically important Vietnamese border towns. Instead of pushing forward, Beijing announced that Chinese troops would begin to return to China. But the confrontation between China and Vietnam did not end with the withdrawal of Chinese troops. Throughout the 1980s, the borders between the two countries were turned into a front of protracted warfare.

In the case of Cuba, Beijing's leaders firmly opposed its intervention in Africa. They regarded Havana as another major agent of Moscow's hegemonic and expansionist ambition. Revolutionary Cuba was the first country in the western hemisphere to recognize the PRC. In the early 1960s, Beijing and Havana maintained a very close relationship. Yet, beginning in the mid-1960s, Sino–Cuban relations deteriorated in the context of the great Sino–Soviet polemic debate. When the Cultural Revolution occurred in China, Beijing openly attacked Fidel Castro and Cuba's domestic and international policies, causing hostility and conflicts to develop between the two Communist countries. In the early 1970s, Sino–Cuban relations experienced a short period of improvement. Yet, this episode quickly ended following Sino–US rapprochement, which Havana criticized fervently. In December 1974, Chinese vice premier Li Xiannian told the Cuban ambassador to China that "it is absolutely true that there exist differences in principles between China and Cuba."[45] After 1976, when Cuba dispatched "volunteers" to Africa, Beijing's relations with Havana worsened rapidly. Chinese leaders openly accused Cuba's intervention in Africa – and in Angola in particular – as part of Moscow's grand plan to dominate the world. In accordance with this perception, Chinese policies toward Africa were also formulated around what would be best for containing the Soviet threat. In Angola, Beijing firmly supported Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in the Angolan Civil War simply because its main enemy was the Moscow-backed People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Beijing was also unfriendly toward Mengistu Haile Mariam's Socialist Ethiopia.

In late December 1979, Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan. For Beijing's leaders, this confirmed what they had believed during the previous decade: The Soviet threat was not only real but worsening. Immediately after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Beijing's leaders decided to denounce it, as well as to prepare for possible consequences associated with it. Deng pointed out that the Soviet invasion, as "an important step toward pursuing worldwide hegemony," created threats of the most serious nature to peace and security in Asia as well as in the world.[46] On 10 January 1980, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson announced that

the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had created a new barrier to the improvement of relations between Beijing and Moscow.[47] Then, Beijing decided that China – which had just restored its membership in the International Olympic Committee – would join a group of others – mostly Western capitalist countries – in boycotting the Olympic Games in Moscow in the summer of 1980. Throughout the 1980s, even when tensions between Beijing and Moscow began to reduce after 1982–1983, Beijing provided substantial military and other support to Pakistan and, largely through Pakistan, to the resistance forces in Afghanistan. Beijing's close cooperation with Pakistan, in turn, made it more difficult for Sino–Indian relations to improve.

In the meantime, shared interests in containing Soviet expansion in Afghanistan allowed Beijing and Washington to develop a cooperative relationship (although on a limited scale) in military and security spheres. In January and May 1980, right after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the US Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, and the Chinese Defense Minister, Geng Biao, exchanged visits. By the end of 1980, Washington had approved "export licenses for some 400 items in the area of advanced technology in military support equipment."[48] When Ronald Reagan was elected US President in November 1980, despite his campaign promise that he would restore the "official relationship" with Taiwan and, after the election, and his decision to continue arms sales to Taiwan, he did not go so far as to undermine the foundation of Sino–US relations. While naming the Soviet Union as the "Evil Empire," Reagan continuously viewed China as a useful partner in the US mission to contain and defeat the Soviet Union in the Cold War competition.

By 1982–1983, Chinese foreign policy had reached another critical juncture. The most important factor in the background was that the "reform and opening" process, in political, social, economic, and ideological senses, had brought China past the point of no return. Indeed, it would have been next to impossible for any force to have brought China back to any of the following: The planning economy, the closed society, the Maoist ideology and Maoist mass mobilization phenomenon, the utopian-style justification of the legitimacy foundation of the state, or the isolated international status and the "revolutionary country" identity. In the meantime, the international conditions facing China were also changing. In Sino–US relations, the difficulties that Beijing encountered, especially on the Taiwan question, with the Reagan administration made Deng and his fellow Chinese leaders rethink how best to define the scope of Sino–US relations. In Beijing's dealings with Moscow, in March 1982, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev openly stated that the Soviet Union did not intend to threaten China, and that Moscow was willing to improve relations with Beijing.

These new domestic and international conditions combined together would lead to one of the most fundamental changes in the Chinese leadership's general perception of world affairs: They gradually abandoned

the old estimate of the danger of a new world war. In the Maoist discourse, revolutions were always closely associated with wars. Throughout the history of the PRC, yet especially since the 1960s, Beijing persistently claimed that because of the existence of imperialism, a new world war could only be delayed but not averted. With the process in China's modernization drive and improvement in its security environment, Deng concluded that "it is possible that there will be no large-scale war for a fairly long time to come and that there is hope of maintaining world peace."[49]

At the CCP's twelfth national congress, convened in September 1982, Deng and the Party leadership announced that Chinese foreign policy would follow the basic principle of "independence and self-determination" (that is, keeping distance from both superpowers), would highlight the universality of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, and not enter any alliance with any country. The Third World remained important for China, according to the CCP leadership, especially because they believed that the overall influences of the Third World were increasing in international affairs. In the meantime, as China was also a part of the Third World and a developing county itself, it was crucial not to over-commit China's resources to supporting other Third World countries. In this respect, Deng's words were revealing:

> Our work toward the Third World should be strengthened in the future. As we ourselves are also facing difficult challenges, our support to other Third World countries cannot increase in volume. But we may increase friendly exchanges on all levels as well as enhance people-to-people relations.[50]

Deng also tried to introduce these ideas to leaders of other Third World countries. In meeting Samuel Kanyon Doe, Liberia's Head of State, on 5 May 1982, Deng made the following remarks:

> China has not given much help to its Third World friends. That is because our country, although vast in territory, is very poor and still faces many difficulties.... We are now devoting all our efforts to construction and the rather rapid development of our economy. When we have succeeded, we shall be able to do more for our friends in the Third World.[51]

After 1982, Beijing virtually stopped using Mao's three-worlds thesis in describing the structure of the world. Also disappearing from China's international discourse was the rhetoric of "the international united front against hegemony." China's partnership with the US, though weakened in the early years of the Reagan administration, was enhanced during the rest of the 1980s, especially in economic fields. In Sino–Soviet relations, Brezhnev's March 1982 speech mentioned earlier was welcomed by Deng, who

made it clear that he was willing to reduce tensions between China and the Soviet Union. At the same time, Deng emphasized that unless Moscow used action to prove its intention, improved relations would not be achieved. Thus Beijing raised removal of "three big barriers" as the pre-condition for the improvement of Sino–Soviet relations: that Moscow should reduce its military forces deployed on Soviet–Sino and Mongolian–Sino borders, that Soviet troops should withdraw from Afghanistan, and that Vietnamese troops should withdraw from Cambodia.[52]

Thus it was two Third World issues – Afghanistan and Vietnam – that had blocked the prospect of quick improvement of Sino–Soviet relations. Of the two issues, Vietnam was the more difficult challenge for Beijing and Moscow: from the Soviet perspective, this was a question concerning a third country over which Moscow had no final control; but from Beijing's perspective, this was an issue of utmost importance as China's border war with Vietnam continued throughout most of the 1980s.

But the real issue involved in the Chinese leader's deliberation about the Vietnam question was not international but profoundly domestic. In the final analysis, China's continued confrontation with Vietnam would serve the needs on the part of Deng and his fellow Chinese leaders to identify useful resources for coping with the ever-deepening legitimacy crisis that the Chinese Communist state was facing in the age of "reform and opening." When Deng made the decision to "teach the Vietnamese a lesson," it provided him with a highly valuable opportunity to confirm his control of China's military and political power, as well as to crush any possible opposition to his position as China's paramount leader. Then, the confrontation with Vietnam created a sustained source – one that had the power to appeal to the Chinese people's patriotism and nationalistic feelings – of domestic mobilization. Throughout the 1980s, popular literature, movies, and music extolling People's Liberation Army soldiers' heroic fighting against the ungrateful Vietnamese in a "war of self-defense," formed an overwhelming theme in Beijing's campaigns for promoting "love of the socialist motherland." At a time when the "reform and opening" policies created profound economic inequality within Chinese society and, as a result, the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist regime was seriously called into question, the confrontation with Vietnam and Beijing's representation of it to the Chinese people served to retain the support of ordinary Chinese for the regime in Beijing. One of the most important results of this approach, however, was that the international Communist movement would remain deeply divided – at a time when the global Cold War was approaching its end.

Indeed, by the mid-1980s – that is, the end of the long 1970s – Beijing's leaders had probably realized that, in many key ways, the Soviet Union actually was a superpower in decline, but they would not acknowledge that they had almost certainly contributed to it. In addition to Beijing's partnership with Washington, which effectively altered the balance of

power between the two superpowers, China's West-capitalist-market-oriented reforms undermined Moscow's claim that Communism remained a viable alternative to capitalism. Furthermore, Beijing's repudiation of the Soviet model discouraged other Third World countries from looking at Communism as a useful and competitive path toward modernity.[53] By doing so, China had virtually withdrawn from the Cold War. The Soviet Union and its Bloc persisted in the Cold War, but they found that this was a course increasingly more difficult for them to sustain. All of this, in one way or another, was the logical result of China's changing Third World policies, especially in the last two decades of the Cold War.

Notes

1 The term "long 1970s" was created by Professor Odd Arne Westad of the London School of Economics. He and I have used the term in our joint research project on "China's Great Transformation in the Long 1970s." We believe that China's Great Transformation was a process longer, broader, larger and deeper than the "reform and opening" process that began in the late 1970s. For us, the "long 1970s" covers the period from the late 1960s to the early and mid-1980s.

2 *Mao Zedong on Diplomacy* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1993), p. 454.

3 Mao, "Talks with Anna Louis Strong," *Mao Zedong xuanji*, Vol. 4 (Selected Works of Mao Zedong) (Beijing: Renmin, 1965), pp. 1191–2; *Renmin ribao* (People's Daily), 4 January 1947.

4 For discussions, see Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino–American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

5 For China's involvement in the First Indochina War, see Zhai Qiang, *China and the Vietnam Wars* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), ch. 1–2.

6 See, for example, Liu Shaoqi to Stalin, "Report on Strategies of National Revolutionary Movements in East Asia," 14 August 1949, *Jianguo yilai Liu Shaoqi wengao*, Vol. 1 (Liu Shaoqi's Manuscripts since the Formation of the People's Republic) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 2005), pp. 50–3.

7 The Five Principles, also known as Pancha Shila, included (1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, (2) non-aggression, (3) non-interference in other countries' internal affairs, (4) equal and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence.

8 Pei Jianzhang *et al.*, *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiao shi, 1949–1956* (A Diplomatic History of the People's Republic of China, 1949–1956) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1994), pp. 231–51.

9 See, for example, Mao's speech at a Politburo enlarged meeting, 7 July 1954. The Chinese chairman stated that "the biggest ambition of the United States at the moment is to castigate the intermediate zone, including the entire area from Japan to Britain, and to make all these countries cry while castigating them." *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 6 (A Collection of Mao Zedong's Works) (Beijing: Renmin, 1999), p. 334.

10 Mao Zedong, "Speech at the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties," *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, Vol. 6 (Mao Zedung's Manuscripts since the Formation of the People's Republic) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1992), pp. 635–6.

11 Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), ch. 7.

12 For a more detailed discussion, see Chen Jian, "The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union," *Journal of Cold War History*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Summer 2006), pp. 54–101.
13 Zheng Qian, "The Nationwide War Preparations before and after the CCP's Ninth Congress," *Zhonggong dangshi ziliao* (CCP History Materials), 41 (April 1992), p. 205.
14 *Mao Zedong on Diplomacy*, p. 388.
15 Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, ch. 7.
16 Ibid., pp. 230–2.
17 Chen Jian, "Limits of the 'Lips and Teeth' Alliance: An Historical Review of Chinese-North Korean Relations," Woodrow Wilson Center *Asian Program Special Report*, No. 115 (September 2003), p. 7.
18 Yang Kuisong, "The Sino–Soviet Border Clash of 1969," *Cold War History*, Vol. 1, No. 1(August 2000), pp. 25–31.
19 For more substantial discussions about how the failure of Mao's "continuous revolution" shaped the larger context in which the Chinese-American rapprochement occurred, see Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, ch. 9.
20 Margaret Macmillan, *Nixon and Mao: The Week that Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2007).
21 "Mao Zedong's conversation with Moussa Traoré," 22 June 1973, Song Yongyi (ed.), *Zhongguo wenhua dageming wenku* (Database of the Cultural Revolution, online database).
22 *Mao Zedong on Diplomacy*, p. 454.
23 "Mao Zedong's conversations with Houari Boumediene," 25 February 1974, CCP Central Committee Document, (1974), No. 10, Fujian Provincial Archive, 244-1-106, p. 4.
24 *Renmin ribao*, 11 April 1974, p. 1.
25 Li Ping *et al.*, *Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1949–1976* (A Chronological Record of Zhou Enlai, 1949–1976) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1997), p. 691.
26 Chen Jinghua, *Guoshi yishu* (Recollections and Accounts on State Affairs) (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi, 2005), ch. 1.
27 See, for example, Mao Zedong's talk with French Foreign Minister Maurice Schuman, 10 July 1972, *Mao Zedong on Diplomacy*, p. 452.
28 Mao Zedong's conversation with Kissinger, 17 February 1973, *Dangde wenxian* (Party History Documents), No. 2, 2002. The US record of the conversation, however, misses "China" in the sentence. See Memorandum of Conversation, Mao and Kissinger, 17–18 February 1973, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1973–1976, Vol. 18 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), p. 131.
29 Mao Zedong's talks with Wang Hongwen and Zhang Chunqiao, 4 July 1973, cited from *Dangde wenxian*, No. 2, 2002, pp. 70–1.
30 Wang Taiping (ed.), *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1970–1978* (A Diplomatic History of the People's Republic of China) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1999) pp. 452–3.
31 Ibid., pp. 143–4, 151–2.
32 Ibid., p. 153.
33 Wang Taiping *et al.*, *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1957–1969* (A Diplomatic History of the People's Republic of China, 1957–1969) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1998), pp. 174–5.
34 *Renmin ribao*, 14 January 1973, p. 1; see also *Renmin ribao*, 20 January 1974.
35 F. S. Aijazuddin, *From a Head, through a Head, to a Head: The Secret Channel between the US and China through Pakistan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

36 Chen Jian, "China, the Vietnam War, and the Sino–American Rapprochement, 1968–1973," Odd Arne Westad and Sophie Quinn-Judge (eds.), *The Third Indochina War: Conflict between China, Vietnam and Cambodia, 1972–79* (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 53–9.
37 Mao's talks with Kim Il-sung, 18 April 1975, and Deng's talks with Kim, 20 April 1975, CCP Central Archive; see also Leng Rong and Wang Zuoling *et al.*, *Deng Xiaoping nianpu* (A Chronological Record of Deng Xiaoping) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 2004), Vol. 1: pp. 36–7.
38 Hua Guofeng's political report at the CCP's eleventh national Congress, 12 August 1977, *Renmin ribao,* 19 August 1977.
39 For example, in a speech at a CCP Central Military Commission plenary meeting on 28 December 1977, Deng made it clear that the CCP should "apply Comrade Mao Zedong's strategy of differentiating the three worlds and follow his line in foreign affairs." He pointed out that "the global strategy of the United States has shifted to the defensive after its defeat in Vietnam," and that the Soviet, while on the offensive, "has not yet finished its global strategic deployment." *Deng Xiaoping xuanji,* Vol. 2 (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping) (Beijing Renmin, 1983), p. 74.
40 Information gained from an August 2008 interview with a leading Chinese party historian.
41 Yang Meihong, *Yingsu huagong: wo zai miangong shiwu nian* (Red Poppy: My Fifteen Years with the Burmese Communist Party) (Hong Kong: Tiandi, 2001), pp. 263–4.
42 Chin Peng, *My Side of History* (Singapore: Media Masters, 2003), pp. 457–8.
43 Odd Arne Westad, "China, the Third World, and the Last Years of the Cold War," *Lengzhan guoji shi yanjiu* (Cold War International History Studies), No. 4 (October 2007), pp. 132–3.
44 An interview with Teng Hsiao-ping (Deng Xiaoping) by Hedley Donovan and Marsh Clark, *Time,* 5 February 1979.
45 Wang Taiping *et al.*, *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1970–1978,* p. 456.
46 Leng and Wang *et al.*, *Deng Xiaoping nianpu,* Vol. 1, p. 589.
47 Tian Zengfei *et al.*, *Gaige kaifang yilai de zhongguo waijiao* (Chinese Diplomacy Since the Reform and Opening to the Outside World) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1993), p. 291.
48 Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977–1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983), p. 424.
49 *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping,* Vol. 3 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994), p. 132.
50 Leng and Wang *et al. Deng Xiaoping nianpu,* Vol. 2, p. 712.
51 Deng Xiaoping's conversation with the Liberian Head of State, Samuel Kanyon Doe, 6 May 1982, *Deng Xiaoping xuanji,* Vol. 2, p. 360.
52 Ibid., pp. 291–2.
53 Indeed, as Odd Arne Westad points out, the huge influence of China's adoption of a new path toward modernity, combined with greater pressures from the West in the late 1970s amd early 1980s, led to "disillusionment with Marxist-inspired planning in the Third World. By the mid-1980s, many Third World countries had embarked on "a gradual move toward market-based economies." Westad, "China, the Third World, and the Last Years of the Cold War," pp. 134–5.